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Abstract 
When considering the legal implications of monitoring and surveillance in the 
workplace, the question may be asked why companies deploy computer 
surveillance and monitoring in the first place. Several reasons may be put 
forward to justify why more than 80% of all major American firms monitor 
employee e-mails and Internet usage. However, what most companies forget is 
the fact that the absence or presence of monitoring and surveillance activities in 
a company holds serious legal consequences for companies. From the 
discussion in this paper it will become apparent that there is a vast difference in 
how most countries approach this subject matter. On the one hand America 
does not afford any employee a reasonable expectation of privacy when it 
comes to the use of corporate computer resources and systems, while in 
contrast to this position the United Kingdom goes out of its way to protect each 
employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This paper will not only 
investigate the different approaches followed by some of the world-leader, but 
will also investigate the legal consequences embedded in each approach. This 
paper will ultimately enable the reader to judge for himself/herself which 
approach his/her country should follow while being fully informed of the legal 
consequences attached to the chosen approach. 
Keywords: information security, legal issues, monitoring and surveillance, 
privacy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are various legal issues that are embedded in workplace monitoring and 
surveillance. Mainly, there are two main schools of thought that exist on this 
subject-matter. On the one hand there are those that argue that employers are 
the owners of the computing equipment, resources and systems and they 
therefore have a right to monitor how their property is being used, and then 
there are those that argue that employees’ rights to privacy should weigh more 
than that of any employer.  
When examining the relevant statutes, case law and regulations it becomes 
apparent that in most jurisdictions a notice requirement exist, but this notice of 
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surveillance and/or monitoring is rarely sufficient. This paper will examine 
Internet and e-mail related surveillance and monitoring in the workplace from a 
comparative legal perspective. Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to inform 
readers of the current legal position existing in some of the most important 
jurisdictions world-wide, thereby enabling readers to make up their own minds 
on which approach their country should follow, and enabling readers to 
understand the legal consequences embedded in each approach. 
2. JUSTIFICATION FOR MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN 
THE WORKPLACE 
“Surveillance technology is neither inherently bad nor good, but …there is 
both good and bad surveillance.” 
When considering the legal implications of monitoring and surveillance in the 
workplace, the question may be asked why companies deploy computer 
surveillance and monitoring in the first place. Several reasons may be put 
forward to justify why more than 80% of all major American firms monitor 
employee e-mails and Internet usage. The first reason centers around employee 
productivity. As a result of the Internet and e-mails employee productivity has 
decreased. This is a major concern for employers, as Internet use surveys 
continue to indicate that the majority of employees spend anywhere from 10 
minutes to an hour every day surfing sites unrelated to doing their jobs – using 
their work computers to read virtual newspapers, or go online shopping, or 
even viewing naked woman. Secondly, network performance must be 
considered. Employees that download video or audio files from the Internet are 
taking up a great amount of bandwidth. It therefore makes sense that employers 
spend money on Internet monitoring tools rather than on increasing the 
bandwidth. Thirdly, the very real risk exists that a company may be held 
legally liable for the online activities performed by its employees. For example 
the brokerage firm of Morgan Stanley was exposed to $70 million lawsuit 
because of racist jokes that appeared on the company’s e-mail system. Also, 
Dow Chemicals discovered through computer surveillance technologies that 50 
employees were using the company’s computers to store and send sexual or 
violent images, resulting in the termination of all of these employees. Fourthly, 
all companies are faced with the ever present ‘insider threat’. It is therefore 
understandable that companies will go to great lengths to protect the 
confidentiality of its corporate information and trade secrets even if it is from 
its own employees.  
3. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE – THE CANADIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 Introduction 
It is generally accepted that in terms of Canadian law employees enjoy very 
little to no privacy protection in the workplace when it comes to computer and 
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email surveillance. MacIsaac observes: “…many employers consider electronic 
mail sent and received using company computer equipment and stored on 
company computer networks to be the property of the employer. From the 
employer’s perspective this is a business resource paid for by the employer and 
is to be used only for business purposes. Therefore, e-mail messages and 
telephone conversations made on behalf of the employee in the course of 
business should be made available for review for legitimate business and 
security reasons. For these reasons, an employee acting on behalf of their 
employer should have no reasonable expectation of privacy”. 
This view was supported in an arbitration case in which a college lab 
technician’s employment was terminated after sending unwarranted allegation 
against other employees to the campus-wide email message board. The case 
finding reiterated the principle of ‘office e-mail: no reasonable expectation of 
privacy’. 
Today however, a definite move towards finding a balance between monitoring 
and privacy may be observed in Canadian law. As stated in the previous 
chapter, the most important source of privacy protection in Canada is found in 
the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 
2000. PIPEDA recognizes the importance of finding a balance between an 
employer’s need to collect certain personal data, and an employee’s need for 
privacy protection. The Act states: “…the purpose of this part [Protection of 
Personal Information in the Private Sector] is to establish, in an era in which 
technology increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, 
rules to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a 
manner that recognizes the rights to privacy of individuals with respect to their 
personal information and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose 
personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would consider 
appropriate in the circumstances”. 
3.2 Regulatory framework – PIPEDA 
When evaluating employee surveillance within the ambit of PIPEDA the 
following observations should be made: 
(i) Firstly, the provision in PIPEDA of ‘appropriate purpose’ limits 
the use, collection and disclosure of personal information to 
situations which a reasonable person would deem to be appropriate 
under the circumstances. Within the ambit of the workplace this 
would imply that mere consent by an employee to surveillance is 
no longer sufficient as the provision clearly states that a reasonable 
person must consider the circumstances to be appropriate. 
Therefore it may be argued that where surveillance takes place 
under the façade of creating and maintaining a harassment free and 
safe working environment, it is likely that the courts will declare 
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such surveillance to be unlawful because of the absence of a 
known issue in response to which surveillance takes place; 
(ii) Secondly, PIPEDA requires of companies must appoint a privacy 
officer who will be responsible for ensuring that the company 
complies with its privacy obligations. The act suggests that the 
collection of personal workplace data no longer falls within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the company’s technology personnel, but 
the privacy officer must also be involved; 
(iii) Thirdly, the act contains specific provision relating to the 
notification of employees of workplace surveillance. It is expected 
of companies to: (a) identify the purpose for which the data is 
being collected; (b) obtain consent prior to collection; and (c) to 
limit collection of personal data to that which is necessary for the 
purposes as set out by the company. The aim of these provisions 
are to: (a) limit the type of information a company may collect; 
and (b) demand of companies to inform their employees of the 
surveillance policies of the company. The act does however 
contain an exception to the general rule that notice must be given 
to employees before surveillance may take place. Section 7(1) (b) 
of the act states:  “…an organization may collect personal 
information without the knowledge or consent of the individual 
only if …it is reasonable to expect that the collection with the 
knowledge or consent of the individual would compromise the 
availability or the accuracy of the information and the collection is 
reasonable for purposes related to investigating a breach of an 
agreement or a contravention of laws of Canada or a province”. 
(iv) Fourthly, the Act requires that “personal information shall be 
retained only as long as is necessary for the fulfillment of the 
[identified] purpose”. Therefore, this provision regulates an 
employers’ use of information after collection thereof. Employers 
are furthermore prohibited from keeping personal information for 
an unlimited time period. 
3.3 Employee monitoring and surveillance – The present position in 
Canada 
The Canadian court’s commitment to privacy protection has come to the fore 
in recent years. In 1999 the B.C. Supreme Court ruled in the Weir case that e-
mail does enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy. Also in that same year the 
case of Pacific Northwest Herb Corp v Thompson 1999 BCJ No 2772 came 
before the court. Thompson was an employee of Pacific Northwest who used 
the company’s computer in his home for business and personal purposes. After 
termination of his employment he continued using the company computer for 
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personal purposes. Amongst the documents on the computer was a file 
containing documents relating to the wrongful dismissal action he was 
planning to institute against Pacific Northwest. Before returning the computer 
to the company he hired a computer consultant to erase all the data on the hard 
drive. His attempts were however unsuccessful, and after returning the 
computer to Pacific Northwest the company was able to restore the data. 
Thompson sought an interdict to prevent Pacific Northwest to exploit the data, 
claiming that his right to privacy and solicitor-client privilege has been 
infringed. The judge in this case concluded that Thompson had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding documents that were created for personal use.  
In R v Duarte 1990 1 SCR 945 the judge concluded that although the right to 
privacy was not absolute, it must be “judged against what is reasonable in the 
circumstances and, amongst other things, is dependant upon competing 
interests such as the relationship between the parties”. The court went even 
further and stated that in order to determine what would amount to ‘reasonable 
in the circumstances’, three considerations must be kept in mind: (i) whether it 
was reasonable to request surveillance; (ii) whether the surveillance was 
conducted in a reasonable manner; and (iii) whether any other alternatives to 
surveillance were available to the employer. 
This case has been approved in many other cases. In St Mary’s Hospital and 
HEU 64 LAC (4th) 382 an electrician discovered a video camera in the ceiling 
of a manager’s office. The local union was outraged at this surreptitious 
surveillance, and filed a grievance. The arbitrator found in this case that 
surveillance can be characterized in three ways: (a) benign surveillance which 
would entail surveillance done for the benefit of the employee; (b) security 
surveillance which has as its main aim to ensure the protection of employees as 
well as the employer; and (c) surreptitious surveillance which represents the 
most intrusive force of surveillance. The arbitrator was of the opinion that this 
form of surveillance requires strict justification. Furthermore, in Re Toronto 
Transit Commission and ATU Loc 113 (Belsito) 95 LAC (4th) 402 and in New 
Flyer Industries Ltd and CAW Canada Loc 3003 (Mogg) 85 LAC (4th) 304 the 
court acknowledged that “surveillance by an employer may, in certain 
circumstances, infringe upon an employee’s right to privacy to an unreasonable 
extent”. 
The Privacy Commissioner has made his views on workplace surveillance, the 
privacy of e-mails and the reasonable expectation of privacy clear. The 
Commissioner states: “I don’t accept that the protection necessarily translates 
into wholesale surveillance of e-mails or computer use. We accept that there 
are stringent limits on an employer’s rights to read employees’ mail, eavesdrop 
on their telephone calls or rifle through their desk drawers. I think we have to 
look closely at e-mail communications to see what principles should apply 
there as well”. 
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The Commissioner went on to comment on the practice of some companies to 
state in their email policies that the employees should have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when using the e-mail systems: “[t]he law of privacy 
has developed around the notion of the ‘reasonable expectation’; one of the 
ways that the courts determine whether privacy has been violated has been to 
determine first whether a person could have reasonable expected privacy in a 
particular place and time. But I don’t agree that it follows that an employee’s 
or anyone’s privacy can be simply eradicated by telling them not to expect any. 
While management has the right and the responsibility to manage, it has to 
operate within limits, including respect for fundamental rights. It is not for 
management alone to determine whether an expectation of privacy is 
reasonable”. 
Therefore, a clear shift in the pendulum in Canadian law may be observed. In 
the past emphasis was placed on whether or not the employee had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, today emphasis is placed on the question whether or not 
the surveillance is reasonable. It is now accepted that workplace surveillance, 
whether it be by video camera, server-side computer monitoring, or client-side 
computer monitoring, cannot be justified by simply giving notice to an 
employee. An investigation will have to be launched into the reasonableness of 
the surveillance. 
Geist identifies six factors which may be taken into consideration when 
wanting to determine whether or not the computer or email surveillance is 
reasonable in terms of Canadian law: 
(i) The target of the surveillance – Consideration must be given to 
whether computer surveillance will be conducted across the 
company as a whole or if it will be targeted against specific 
employees; 
(ii) Purpose of the surveillance – Companies that install new 
surveillance technologies must be able to show how these 
technologies support their objectives; 
(iii) Alternatives to surveillance – It is suggested that other surveillance 
technologies that are much less intrusive on an employee’s right to 
privacy in the workplace must first be investigated; 
(iv) The surveillance technology – The choice of surveillance 
technology must be reasonable taking into account the purpose of 
the surveillance; 
(v) Adequacy of notice – in terms of the Criminal Code as well as 
PIPEDA consent must be obtained from the employee. This would 
entail not merely informing employees of the fact of surveillance 
but also giving them an accurate description of the company’s 
surveillance practices; and 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 2(2) 
29 
(vi) The implementation of the surveillance activities – the company 
will have to ensure that unauthorized persons are not able to gain 
access to the surveillance information. 
3.4 Conclusion 
From the above it may be concluded that in Canadian law neither the right to 
privacy nor the right to surveillance is absolute. Canadian law attempts to find 
a balance between the interest of the employer and the rights of the employee 
by focusing on the reasonableness of the surveillance. 
4. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE – 
THE AMERICAN POSITION 
4.1 Introduction  
At present the position in America is that no employee has any constitutional, 
federal or common law legal remedies for redress where an employer abuses 
email and Internet monitoring and surveillance.  
4.2 Constitutional protection against employee monitoring and 
surveillance 
? Federal constitution 
The US Constitution does not afford anyone the right to privacy expressly. The 
constitution only recognizes privacy as a penumbral theory. This explains why 
the right to privacy has not been extended to protect an employee’s electronic 
communications. Cherminisky observes: “[m]ost Americans would be 
surprised to learn that there is no right to privacy granted in the United States 
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects privacy in limiting police 
searches and arrests, but privacy in terms of autonomy and the right to be left 
alone by the government is not mentioned in the text of the Constitution”. 
Consequently, the present position in the United States is that employees, in a 
private workplace, are not afforded any protection against electronic 
surveillance because of the doctrine of state surveillance. In contrast to this 
public sector employees have a certain degree of constitutional protection 
against abusive monitoring in the workplace. Included in this would be the 
right to reasonable searches and seizures. American courts have even gone so 
far as to state that public sector employees have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding their emails and Internet communications. 
? State constitution 
Privacy protection in respect of state constitutions vary to a great extend. It is 
however important to bear in mind that to date no court has extended state 
constitutional protection of privacy to email monitoring and surveillance in the 
workplace. Most states do not require employers to give employees any form 
of notification when monitoring their emails and Internet communications. 
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4.3 Federal legislation – The ECPA 
? Title I of the ECPA – The Federal Wiretap Statute 
In terms Title I (The federal Wiretap Act) of the ECPA interception of 
electronic communications such as telephone calls and emails are prohibited. 
The Act prohibits the following activities: 
(i) intercepting or endeavoring to intercept electronic 
communications; 
(ii) disclosing or endeavoring to disclose intercepted electronic 
communications; and 
(iii) using the content of intercepted information. 
It therefore follows that if an employer intercepts email or monitors Internet 
communications of his/her employee, his actions will fall within the ambit of 
the ECPA. The following important observations must be, made in this regard. 
First, it is required that the interception and/or monitoring should be made 
intentional. Secondly, the content of the communication is only protected as 
long as it is under transmission. Consequently, Title I will not be applicable 
where an employer searches an employee’s stored emails.  
Two exceptions are contained in Title I. First, the ECPA allows service 
provides to intercept and disclose electronic communication if either the sender 
or the receiver consented thereto, or the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception 
can be applied. The latter exception however, proves to be highly problematic. 
In order for an employer to make use of the ‘ordinary course of business 
exception’ it is expected of the employer to proof the following: 
(i) the device used to intercept the electronic communication is “a 
telephone or telegraphic instrument, equipment or facility, or 
a…component thereof,” provided or installed by the employer 
himself/herself; and 
(ii) that the specific device is employed by the employer in his/her 
ordinary course of business.  
It must furthermore be borne in mind that an employer is only authorized to 
intercept the communication for long enough to determine the nature of the 
conversation. Once the employer has determined that the communication is 
personal in nature he/she must immediately terminate interception.  
? Title II of the ECPA – The Stored Communications Act of 2005 
Title II of the ECPA (The Stored Communications Act of 2005) provides 
guidance when wanting to obtain access or disclosure of electronic 
communication, such as messages left on a voice machine, once in storage. A 
violation of Title II will result in civil liability for any person who (a) 
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intentionally accesses, without authorization, a facility through which an 
electronic communication service is provided; or (b) intentionally exceeds an 
authorization access and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access 
to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage. 
As soon as an electronic message has been stored the SCA will regulate the 
situation. This is irrespective of the length of storage. 
When considering the operation of Title II it becomes evident that emails are 
generally considered to be stored communications in terms of American law. 
Consequently, employers are authorized to access electronic communications 
under this title. However, this means that Title I of the ECPA is in actual fact 
rendered useless.  
From the above discussion it may be concluded that in virtually all cases 
decided by American courts in the last decade it has been decided that 
employees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In some instance 
American courts have gone so far as to validate employee monitoring even 
where advance warning was not given to the employee. The following 
American case law supports this statement: 
? Employee monitoring and surveillance without notice 
In Restuccia v Burk Technology 1996 Mass Super LEXIS 367 (Super Ct 
(Mass) Aug 13 1996) the employer neglected to have an email policy stating 
the possibility that emails can be monitored, stored on back-up or that emails 
may not be used for personal messages. When viewing back-up files the 
employer discovered email messages containing nick-names for the president 
of the company and references to an extra-marital affair with another 
employee. The president of the company terminated the two employee’s 
employment based on the fact that they were using the email system too much. 
The ex-employees argued that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because of the fact that they had personal passwords to access their message 
system. the court found that the president’s action of reading the email 
messages on the back-up system constituted an infringement of the privacy of 
the ex employees. In this case the ex-employees were successful in their claim, 
but in every other workplace interception case the defendant’s were awarded 
summary judgment in a claim that workplace surveillance invaded a plaintiff’s 
right of privacy. 
Furthermore, in Smyth v Pillsbury Co 914 F Supp 97 (ED Pa 1996) an 
employee was fired after having made negative comments about a sales 
manager in an email. The email contained treats to “kill the backstabbing 
bastards”. The company had, on various occasions, assured its employees that 
all emails are confidential and privileged. The company based the termination 
of employment on “transmitting what it deemed to be inappropriate and 
unprofessional comments over the company’s e-mail system”. The employee 
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however argued wrongful termination. The federal court decided that the 
termination of the employee was justified, as the employee had no expectation 
of privacy in the employer’s email system. The court went even further to state 
that even if the employee had a reasonable  expectation of privacy it would not 
amount to invasion of privacy if an employer intercepted messages on a system 
it owned.  
Moreover, in McLaren v Microsoft Corp Microsoft 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 
4103, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) accessed personal folders on a 
network in order to investigate claims of sexual harassment. The employee 
claimed that Microsoft had violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
emails that Microsoft eventually uncovered did provide evidence that the 
employee was engaging in a “systematic pattern of sexual harassment”. The 
court held that it was not going to recognise a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy, even though the employee had a special password and the files were 
marked ‘personal’. The court stated in this case that the decisive factor was that 
the computer was the property of the employer and formed part of the 
computer environment. The court furthermore stated that because of the fact 
that the folder was transmitted over the network, it was inevitable that it would 
be accessed by a third party at some stage. Consequently, the plaintiff had no 
expectation of privacy with regards to the files marked ‘private’.  
? Employee monitoring and surveillance with  notice 
By implementing an email and Internet policy companies safeguard themselves 
against any privacy-based claims by employees. In Bourke v Nissan Motor 
Corp Nissan California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Case No. 
B068705 (July 1996) made every employee sign a waiver form in which they 
had to acknowledge that they understood that Nissan’s email system was to be 
used for business purposes exclusively. In this case the court decided that this 
waiver was fatal to any claim an employee can bring based on invasion of 
privacy. 
Furthermore, in Garrity v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 2002 
US Dist. LEXIS 8343 (D Mass. May 7, 2000) two long term employees 
forwarded sexually explicit jokes to third parties. One of their co-workers 
complaint after receiving such an email. The company had an email policy 
providing that “messages that are defamatory, abusive, obscene, profane, 
sexually orientated, threatening or racially offensive” are prohibited. The two 
woman’s employment was consequently terminated. The court dismissed the 
privacy based action brought by the two women stating that employees do not 
have any reasonable expectation of privacy pertaining to work related emails. 
The court furthermore made a very harsh statement by stating that the fact that 
the company had an email policy was irrelevant. The court concluded that the 
employer’s right and duty to limit harassment in the workplace outweighs any 
rights the plaintiffs’ though they had in respect of privacy.  
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Moreover, in Thygeson v US Bancorp 2004 US Dist. LEXIS 18863 (D. Ore. 
Sept 15, 2004) the bank’s employment handbook stated that employees were 
prohibited to “use US Bancorp computer resources for personal business”. The 
handbook furthermore stated “do not access inappropriate internet sites and do 
not send emails which may be perceived as offensive, intimidating, or hostile 
or that are in violation of Company policy”. One of Bancorp’s employees were 
spending more than four hours a day visiting non work related Internet sites on 
his work computer. The company furthermore discovered that he was viewing 
“inappropriate emails containing pictures of nudity and sexually offensive 
jokes”. The employee was subsequently fired. The employee brought an action 
against the bank arguing that they invaded his privacy as well as the federal 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by firing him without 
awarding him severance pay. The court found that the employee had no 
expectation of privacy when his employer accessed the files on its network that 
the plaintiff saved using a personal password, then this employee had no 
expectation of privacy in his email ‘merely labeled personal’ without even 
creating a password.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The conclusion must be reached that when it comes the subject matter of 
workplace monitoring and surveillance, all indication are that it is pro-
employer. Employees have no real remedies for the abuse of email and Internet 
monitoring and surveillance. Furthermore almost all courts in America have 
held that employees do not have a right to privacy in the workplace. Courts 
continue to justify their position by stating that since business computers are 
the property of its employers, employers have an unfettered right to monitor its 
usage. American employees will furthermore be unable to find any relief in the 
US constitution, common law of torts or the ECPA.  
5. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE – 
THE UNITED KINGDOM’S PERSPECTIVE 
5.1 Introduction 
The United Kingdom is a member of the European Union. Consequently, the 
United Kingdom has to comply with EU directives on the subject matter of 
employee monitoring and surveillance. In terms of the European Community 
Treaty it is expected of the UK to propagate enabling legislation which will 
give effect to the fundamental rights as set forth in the Council of Europe 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
1950 (ECHR) and legislation of the EU.  
5.2 Regulatory framework 
Because of the operation of the doctrine of vicarious liability, the UK 
government has accepted that employers do have the right to monitor their 
employees. However, in contrast to the approach followed in America, the 
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right of an employer to monitor is balanced with the employee’s right to 
privacy.  
The legal framework for Internet monitoring in the United Kingdom comprises 
of five main statutes and almost no case law on the subject matter.  
? The Data Protection Act of 1998 
All British employers must comply with the United Kingdom’s implementation 
of the European Union Directive on Data Protection in the form of the Data 
Protection Act of 1998. In terms of the DPA data controllers are compelled not 
only to inform the employee of the monitoring system, but also to protect the 
data processed in accordance with the Data Protection Principles (DPA). 
In terms of the DPA electronic monitoring has to comply with the following 
requirements: 
(i) the monitoring must be lawful and fair; 
(ii) the monitoring program must be necessary; and 
(iii) the monitoring program must be proportionate to achieving the 
legitimate business objective while simultaneously protecting the 
right to privacy of the individual employee. 
In terms of the DPA only one exception exists regarding the notification 
requirement: if electronic monitoring is done with the aim of preventing a 
specific crime the employer will not have to adhere to the notice requirement.  
? The Human Rights Act of 1998 
The DPA furthermore takes cognizance of the Human Rights Act of 1998. In 
terms of this Act the privacy of any private communication, telephone 
conversation and email communication is expressly protected. It is important to 
observe that the Human Rights Act draws a distinction between public and 
private sector employers. If the employer falls within the ambit of the public 
sector, the employee will have a direct cause of action in terms of the Human 
Rights Act. 
Employees in the United Kingdom enjoy further protection in terms of article 8 
of the ECHR. In terms of article 8 of the Act “everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence”. This 
convention affords private employees with a legal remedy to challenge abusive 
monitoring practices. The European Court of Human Rights has extended the 
definition of ‘private life and correspondence’ to include business relations, 
emails and other electronic communications. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s chief regulatory agency (OFTEL) issued 
in 1999 Guidance on recording on private conversations. The aim of these 
guidelines was to provide employers with guidelines when wanting to 
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implement electronic monitoring without violating their employees’ right to 
privacy.  
? The Regulation of Investigative Powers Act of 2000 
In terms of this Act it is a criminal offence to intercept data without 
authorization. It is however important to keep in mind that RIP is not 
applicable to private telecommunications systems such as intranets and Virtual 
Private Networks. Moreover, no provision in RIP addresses electronic 
monitoring in the workplace expressly. In general employers are permitted to 
intercept emails and to monitor Internet access as long as both the sender and 
receiver agree thereto. Employers may furthermore only intercept emails and 
Internet communications if the monitoring is conducted in order to carry out 
the employer’s business activities. 
? The Lawful Business Practice Regulations (LBPR) 
This Act governs the rights and responsibilities of businesses relating to 
monitoring electronic communications. This Act provides certain exceptions to 
the RIP Act. The most important of which is that monitoring without 
compliance with the notice requirement can take place. In terms of this 
exception companies may monitor and keep record of Internet communications 
in order to comply and adhere to regulatory or self-regulatory practices and 
procedures. There is however a limitation placed on monitoring activities by 
providing that such activities may only take place if a company employee uses 
the computer system within the scope of his/her duties. Furthermore, in terms 
of the LBPR interception without consent is authorized if the interception has 
one or more of the following purposes: 
(i) to establish the existence of facts, to ascertain compliance with the 
regulatory or self-regulatory practices or procedures (quality 
control and training); 
(ii) to prevent or detect crimes; 
(iii) to investigate or detect unauthorized use of telecommunication 
systems; 
(iv) to secure; and 
(v) to determine whether or not the communications are business 
communications. 
It should furthermore be kept in mind that interception will only be authorised if 
the controller of the telecommunication system (employer) made reasonable 
efforts to inform potential users that interception may take place. Also the scope 
of application of this Act is limited to business communication therefore the 
interception of personal communications will not be legal in terms of this act. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
In terms of the RIP Act, LBPR and the DPA it would appear that an employer 
will only be authorized to lawful intercept communications if it is done ‘in the 
course of transmission’. The legislature therefore encourages UK companies to 
have a clearly Internet and email usage policy in place. If an employee wants to 
base his/her claim on infringement of privacy, the Code of Practice will be the 
most effective regulation for him/her to rely on.  
6. CONLUSION 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that Canada, the United States and 
the United Kingdom have very different views on the protection that should be 
afforded to employees when dealing with monitoring and surveillance in the 
workplace.  
In America a pro-employer regime is applied in terms of which employees 
have lost all their privacy based actions. Consequently, employees in America 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. It would appear as if American 
employers have an absolute immunity against the constitution, common law 
and federal statutory remedies for abusive surveillance practices. In terms of 
American law it is evident that everything including electronic 
communications on a work computer belongs to the employer. Furthermore, 
business and private communications are deemed to be the property of the 
employer. Therefore, employers are permitted to monitor any electronic 
communication even if the employer has no e-mail and/or Internet usage policy 
in place which could serve to notify employees of the fact that their electronic 
communications are being monitored. 
In stark contrast to the American position, in the UK the monitoring and 
surveillance of employees are strictly proscribed. In the EU and consequently 
in the UK, electronic monitoring must be reasonably based, proportional, 
transparent and non-discriminatory. The European Court of Justice feels that it 
is very important for companies to have written e-mail and Internet usage 
policies stating what the company’s position is regarding employee 
surveillance and monitoring. This is in contrast with the position in America 
where courts have allowed the surveillance of emails even in situations where 
the company guaranteed its employees privilege and confidentiality.  
The Canadian position relating to employee monitoring and surveillance fits in 
comfortably somewhere between the UK and the USA. Although this country 
have enacted legislation regulating employee monitoring and surveillance, with 
a built-in notification requirements. The biggest deficiencies encountered in 
these statutes are that they only contain a notification requirement and not a 
consent requirement.  
The question may be asked which approach is correct? Although from a legal 
perspective most academics would insist that the United Kingdom’s approach 
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is correct, the writer is of the opinion that the current political and social 
climate must play a very important role in deciding which approach a country 
should take to this subject matter. Moreover, when considering the fact that a 
company can incur legal liability for the illegal and inappropriate acts 
performed by its employees when making use of the corporate computer 
resources and systems, the writer feels that an employer should have the right 
to monitor e-mail and Internet usage without too many restraints being placed 
on him/her. Therefore, the writer is in favor of the American position 
pertaining to this subject matter. Perhaps countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Canada should rather ask themselves if they are not empowering 
employees too much, because at the end of the day, it is still the employer’s 
computer resources and systems that are being used, so why should an 
employer not be afforded the right to protect its own assets through monitoring 
and surveillance, especially when considering the fact that an employer can be 
faced with numerous lawsuit based on the inappropriate use of its computer 
assets and resources?  
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